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abstract
Environmental externalities call for the use of environmental taxes to get prices 
right and thereby reduce environmental pressures. To date, however, the Spanish 
government makes only limited use of environmental taxes. One major reason 
for the policy reluctance are concerns on the regressive impacts of environmental 
taxes. We argue that policy can hedge against these concerns by means of revenue 
recycling. More specifically, we assess the impacts of a green tax reform where 
additional revenues are redistributed lump-sum to Spanish households on an 
equal-per-capita basis. Based on quantitative evidence from coupled microsimu-
lation and computable equilibrium analyses we find that such a green tax reform 
leads to a substantial reduction in harmful emissions while having a progressive 
impact.
Keywords: Environmental tax reform, household incidence, computable general 
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f 1. INTRODUCTION g
The use of taxes to correct environmental externalities is a standard public finance propo-
sition rooted in the seminal work of Pigou roughly one hundred years ago (Pigou 1920). Apart 
from protecting the environment as a public good and making the polluters pay for damages, 
environmental taxes raise revenues that can be used to reduce existing tax distortions. Such 
green tax reforms may then provide an opportunity to earn a double (or even triple) dividend 
(Pearce 1991; Repetto 1992). They do not only improve the environment—the first dividend. 
They may also contribute to a reduction of the overall excess burden of the tax system—the 
second dividend—and may help to alleviate involuntary unemployment—the third dividend.1
Given increasing environmental pressures from local air pollution but also global exter-
nalities such as greenhouse gas emissions, international organizations—notably, the European 
Commission (EC 2011), the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2013), and the OECD 
1. The potential effects of green tax reforms have been investigated in a large number of theoretical and applied papers; for early 
surveys see Goulder (1995) and Bovenberg (1999)—a more recent meta-regression analysis of the double-dividend hypothesis is 
provided by Anger et al. (2010).
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(OECD 2015)—have highlighted the importance of boosting environmental taxes in modern 
taxation systems.
While environmental taxes meanwhile play a more prominent role in the tax system of 
various OECD countries (OECD 2017), policy makers in Spain so far have been rather reluc-
tant to make more comprehensive use of environmental taxes (Gago and Labandeira 2014). A 
few additional environmental taxes were introduced in 2012, but according to the Lagares Re-
port (Informe Lagares 2014), these measures remained “fragmentary and limited”.2 In 2015, 
the percentage of tax revenue attributable to energy/environmental taxes3 was 1.8% of GDP, 
compared to 2.4% for the EU-28 average putting Spain to fourth-last in the EU-28 with a 
substantial leeway to top-ranked countries such as Denmark, whose environmental tax revenue 
is 4% of GDP (Eurostat 2017). 
Gago and Labandeira (2014) discuss three major reasons for this lack of political support 
in Spain: 1) concerns on regressive impacts; 2) the threat of adverse competitiveness effects 
which could lower the overall performance of the Spanish economy; and 3) the potential insta-
bility of environmental tax revenues as they are targeted to reduce their source.
Here we focus on regressivity concerns as an important policy caveat against environmen-
tal taxation. The rationale on the regressivity concerns of environmental taxation is straightfor-
ward. Taxes on energy or energy-related pollutants such as CO2, NOx, or SO2 raise consumer 
prices for energy goods such as electricity, natural gas, heating oil or gasoline. Since these goods 
constitute a larger share of the budget for poorer households than for richer households, envi-
ronmental taxes tend to be regressive, in the sense that extra tax payments represent a higher 
percentage of income for poorer households than for the richer households. 
The empirical literature on distributional impacts by and large confirms the regressive 
effects of environmental taxes (for meta-analyses see e.g. OECD 1995, Speck 1999, Speck et 
al. 2006, Leipprand et al. 2007, Peter et al. 2007, Kosonen 2012 or Gago et al. 2014). The Eu-
ropean Environmental Agency (EEA 2011) provides a comprehensive literature survey on the 
implications of environmental taxation for various European countries. Although most of the 
reviewed studies find regressivity, several factors could mitigate or even offset the regressivity, 
such as the specific design of fuel (energy) taxation, spillover effects to factor prices or the use 
of additional tax revenues. Energy taxes on households’ heating fuels are identified as clearly re-
gressive. But taxes on motor fuels (oil, diesel) tend to hit low income groups relatively less than 
high income groups for the case that high income groups tend to spend more on transporta-
tion fuels (as a share of their income) than low income groups.4 Moreover, environmental taxes 
do not only affect the prices of consumer goods, but also can affect sources of income, such as 
wages and returns to capital. Many (partial equilibrium) studies on the incidence of taxation 
focus on the expenditure side and miss the (general equilibrium) feedback effects on factor 
incomes. Finally, the recycling of additional revenues can drastically affect the overall distribu-
2. The report by a committee of Experts for the Reform of the Spanish Tax System (known as the Lagares Report) was issued 
at the request of the Spanish government and submitted in August 2014. It proposed numerous measures for modernizing the 
Spanish tax system including the more comprehensive use of environmental taxes. The report states that green tax reforms are 
“unfinished business” in Spain (see also González-Eguino 2011 or Labandeira and Linares 2013).
3. Tax revenues as recorded by Eurostat are divided into energy taxes (including taxes on CO2 and revenues from the sale/
purchase of CO2 emission permits and taxes on all energy-related goods, including fuels), transport taxes (including those relating 
to the purchase and use of means of transport), pollution taxes (including those on emissions of pollutants such as NOx and SO2 
into the air and water, pesticides, fertilisers and waste management) and taxes on resources (including mineral extraction, fishing 
and wood).
4. For example, progressive impacts of transport taxes are identified for Poland (Kiuila and Sieszynkski 2003) or Spain (La-
bandeira and Labeaga 1999).
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tional consequences either enforcing or offsetting the direct incidence of environmental taxes. 
For example, one can enforce the regressive impacts of heating fuel taxation by combining it 
with a regressive use of revenues (such as a cut in taxes on capital); alternatively, one can opt 
for a progressive use of revenues (such as lump-sum transfers).
In this paper, we make the case for a green tax reform in Spain where revenues are redis-
tributed lump-sum to Spanish households. Our tax reform reflects policy-relevant pressures 
towards new environmental taxes on fuels, local air pollutants and CO2 emissions: 1) a tax 
on CO2 (€40/ton) in all sectors (except transport) which are not covered by the EU emis-
sions trading system; 2) tax increases on fossil fuels to bring them up to the European average 
(1.5% of GDP); and 3) taxes on air pollutants (NOX as well as SO2 emissions at €1000/ton) 
throughout the economy. On the revenue-recycling side, additional taxes are rebated lump-
sum per-capita to private households.5
For our quantitative impact assessment of the proposed tax reform, we combine a 
multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Spanish economy with a 
microsimulation (MS) analysis of Spanish households. We find that the tax reform will entail 
significant reductions in emissions of CO2 (10%), NOX (13%) and SO2 (20%). Additional 
environmental taxes will yield revenues—estimated at €7.3 billion per year—that accommo-
date an annual €400 lump-sum transfer to Spanish households. Lump-sum recycling renders 
the green tax reform clearly progressive, providing first- and second-income quintiles with 
increases in average spending power of €166 and €65 per year, respectively. Households below 
the poverty line would even see their average spending power increased by €174. If we cast 
fairness preferences into a social welfare function with an egalitarian perspective, the tax reform 
improves social welfare—rendering the Spanish tax system greener and fairer.
Our contribution to the applied analysis of environmental taxation is twofold. First, our 
results can vitalize the policy debate on green tax reforms in Spain pointing to the crucial role 
of lump-sum revenue-recycling as a response to regressivity concerns. Second, we base our 
analysis on a powerful combination of computable general equilibrium and microsimulation 
models to capture key drivers of tax incidence in a consistent manner, thereby increasing the 
robustness of simulation results and policy conclusions.
The remainder of this the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 features a brief summary 
of our method of assessment and the underlying data. Section 3 provides a description of the 
environmental tax reform proposed. Section 4 presents our quantitative impact assessment. 
Section 5 concludes.
f 2. METHOD AND DATA OF ASSESSMENT g
For our quantitative impact assessment, we combine a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model of the Spanish economy with a detailed microsimulation (MS) model of in-
come-expenditure patterns across households. The advantage of the CGE–MS combination 
is that we can analyze the economy-wide adjustment to policy reforms and are at the same 
time able to provide a very detailed perspective on the policy incidence across households. 
Our integrated modelling framework does not only feature a rich representation of household 
5. In the policy debate, lump-sum recycling of environmental tax revenues is sometimes referred to as the eco-bonus concept. 
In essence, this concept combines environmental taxes with per-capita refunds. The amount of the eco-bonus is thereby indepen-
dent from the energy consumption of the individual recipients.
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heterogeneity but accounts for important inter-sectoral linkages and price-dependent market 
feedbacks across the whole economy.
2.1 Computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
Our CGE model shares the core logic of canonical multi-sector computable general equi-
librium models (for a detailed algebraic formulation of the core logic see e.g. Böhringer et al. 
2015). Decisions about the allocation of resources are decentralized and the representation of 
behavior by consumers and firms in the model follows the standard microeconomic optimi-
zation framework. Consumers maximize welfare through private consumption subject to a 
budget constraint. Producers combine intermediate inputs and primary factors (labor, capital, 
sector-specific resources) at least cost for given technology. By default, labor and capital are 
treated mobile across sectors while specific resources are tied to sectors. Preferences and tech-
nological constraints are described through nested constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) 
functions that capture demand and supply responses to changes in relative prices. 
Production of commodities other than fossil fuels is captured by nested three-level CES 
cost functions describing the price-dependent use of capital, labor, energy and material in pro-
duction. At the top level, a CES composite of intermediate material demand trades off with 
an aggregate of energy, capital and labor. At the second level, a CES function describes the 
possibilities of substitution between the intermediate demand for the energy aggregate and a 
value-added composite of labor and capital. Finally, at the third level, a CES function captures 
the possibilities of capital and labor substitution within the value-added composite, while 
different energy inputs (coal, gas, oil and electricity) enter the energy composite subject to a 
CES. In the production of fossil fuels, all inputs except the sector-specific fossil fuel resource 
are aggregated in fixed proportions; this aggregate trades off with the sector-specific fossil fuel 
resource at a CES.
Final demand for consumption in the CGE model is determined by a representative house-
hold, which maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint with fixed investment (constant 
savings).6 The representative agent receives income from three primary factors: labor, capital 
and fossil fuel resources (coal, gas and crude oil). Final demand for consumption is given as 
a CES aggregate of composite non-energy consumption and composite energy consumption. 
Both the non-energy consumption composite and the energy consumption composite are in 
themselves CES functions of disaggregate non-energy and energy commodities. 
To reflect involuntary unemployment, we adopt a standard wage curve formulation which 
reflects empirical evidence on the inverse relationship between the level of wages and the rate 
of unemployment (Blanchflower and Oswald 1995).
Bilateral trade follows the Armington (1969) approach of product heterogeneity, where 
domestic and foreign goods are distinguished by their origins. All goods used on the domestic 
market in intermediate and final demand correspond to a CES composite that combines do-
mestically produced goods and the goods imported from other regions. A balance of payment 
6. In our static model analysis, we abstain from tracking impacts of green tax reforms on investment and savings behaviour of 
households. Ultimately, an adequate representation of investment and savings behaviour would call for an intertemporal model 
with rational expectations by individual households which is beyond the scope of our current integrated CGE-MS framework 
where we incorporate lots of household details. 
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constraint incorporates the base-year trade surplus (deficit) which is warranted through an 
endogenous real exchange rate.7
Finally, the CGE model incorporates emissions of CO2, NOX and SO2 via coefficients 
associated with the use of fossil fuels. Emission abatement can take place by fuel switching 
(inter-fuel substitution) or fuel savings (either by fuel-non-fuel substitution or by a scale reduc-
tion of production and final demand activities).
2.2 Microsimulation (MS) model
The MS model captures the economic behavior of consumers and provides a detailed pic-
ture of the substitution effects in consumption following price changes (driven by price elastic-
ities and income elasticities). Consumer demand is estimated using the “Almost Ideal Demand 
System” (AIDS) introduced by Deaton and Muelbauer (1980), the main advantage of which 
is that it permits a linear approximation of a flexible demand system. The AIDS satisfies the 
axioms of the consumer theory and does not impose constraints on the utility function. The 
log-linear approximation (LAIDS) of demand functions is as follows:
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where:
iw  represents the budget share associated with good i for a particular household, 
αi is a constant, 
γ ij is the slope coefficient associated with the j good in the i share equation,
 jp  is the price of good j, 
βi is the slope coefficient for real income,
p stands for the geometric Stone price index8, 
Y is household income (hence, Y / p represents real income),
t denotes the time trend variable, 
d  is a set of dummy variables that control: the type of household,9 the region where the 
household is located in terms of the seven NUTS 1 regions in Spain,10 whether the 
household is living in a private home, the number of rooms in the household, the age 
of the breadwinner, whether the breadwinner is unemployed or retired, the number of 
active members in the household, whether the house is equipped with heating and the 
type of house,11 and
ie  denotes the error term.
7. The balance-of-payment constraint at base-year levels reflects no change in net indebtedness of Spain vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world which is a prerequisite of coherent welfare analysis for domestic policy shocks such as the green tax reforms investigated in 
this paper.
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9. The household categories used in our estimation are the following: adults alone; couple without children; couple with chil-
dren; single-parent households; and the composite of other households.
10. According to the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics at the first level (NUTS 1) there are seven regions in Spain: 
North West (Galicia, Asturias, Cantabria), North East (Basque Community, Navarre, La Rioja, Aragon), Community of Madrid 
(Community of Madrid), Centre (Castile and León, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura), East (Catalonia, Valencian Community, 
Balearic Islands), South (Andalusia, Region of Murcia, Ceuta, Melilla) and Canary Islands (Canary Islands).
11. The house categories used are the following: luxury, high class in urban area, middle class in urban area, low class in urban 
area, rural industrial, rural fishing, and rural agriculture.
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and the symmetry condition is given by:
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We estimate demands for nine consumption categories including food, housing, durables, 
heat, electricity, fuel, transport, leisure and education, and a composite of other products. 
Since the AIDS model is made up of a system of dependent equations, the share equation re-
garding the composite of other products is dropped to overcome singularity problems. Annex 
A reports our regression results.
2.3 Coupling of CGE and MS models
The CGE and MS models are linked iteratively based on the decomposition method by 
Rutherford and Tarr (2008). We first run the CGE model which represents households by 
one single representative household in order to evaluate policy impacts on prices for consumer 
goods and production factors. The MS model then takes these prices as inputs and calculates 
household income and household consumption at the given prices. Based on the MS num-
bers, the representative household in the CGE model is recalibrated to reproduce aggregate 
consumption at given prices. With the recalibrated expenditure function of the representative 
household, the CGE model is solved again and then hands over commodity and factor prices 
for the next iteration round to the MS model. By repeatedly resolving the CGE and MS 
models, the two models converge towards an overall consistent solution. Thus, the coupled 
models produce identical results, as would a stand-alone CGE model with all heterogeneous 
households. The combined CGE–MS approach has the advantage of numerical tractability 
and reduced CPU time given the large number of households in income-expenditure surveys.
2.4 Data
The CGE model is calibrated to Spanish input-output (IO) data for 2014 (INE 2018a). 
Output per sector is linked to household consumption in terms of consumer spending catego-
ries using a conversion matrix. Cross-price substitution elasticities in production other than of 
fossil fuels are based on empirical estimates by Koesler and Schymura (2015). The elasticities 
of substitution in fossil fuel production sectors are calibrated to match exogenous estimates of 
fossil fuel supply elasticities (Graham et al. 1999; Krichene 2002; Ringlund et al. 2008). The 
CO2, NOX, and SO2 emissions from fossil fuels are calculated using physical energy data and 
air emissions accounts for Spain in 2014 compiled by Eurostat (Eurostat 2018). 
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The database used to estimate the microsimulation model is the Spanish household budget 
survey (EPF—see INE 2018b). The EPF is a survey representative of the population of Spain, 
which collects annual information on the consumption patterns and various socio-economic 
characteristics for around 20,000 households. For estimating the LAIDS, we use data from 
2006 to 2013 whereas the microsimulation is operated for 2014 data in consistency with the 
base-year for the CGE simulations. Income sources for households are based on data from the 
Spanish living conditions survey (ECV). To consolidate data sources, we scale the spending 
and demand data from the EPF in line with the data aggregated from the IO table; similarly, 
we scale the household revenue data. Due to missing data on savings by households in the EPF, 
we distribute the aggregated savings reported in the IO data across households according to the 
weight of income from capital in their respective revenues. 
f 3. ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND REVENUE RECYCLING OPTIONS g
In our quantitative impact assessment of green tax reforms, we address alternative pol-
icy-relevant proposals for implementing additional environmental taxes and recycling green 
tax revenues. On the taxation side, proposals involve new environmental taxes on fuels, local 
air pollutants and CO2 emissions. On the recycling side, options include direct rebates to 
households and reductions in social security contributions beyond the default case of leaving 
additional income to the public budget. 
3.1 Tax on vehicle fuels
Given the environmental pressure from traffic, the Lagares Report suggests to increase 
fuel taxes - especially for diesel fuel. Likewise, the International Energy Agency (IEA 2015) is 
supportive of higher fuel taxes in Spain—not at least because of tax harmonization as fuel taxes 
in Spain are below the level of the European average. Here we simulate a tax on vehicle fuels 
to achieve the average revenues share across EU Member States of the EU, i.e. 1.5% of GDP. 
3.2 Tax on SO2 and NOX emissions 
Sulphur dioxide (SO2) and oxides of nitrogen (NOX) are the main causes of harmful air 
pollution. According to the World Health Organisation (WHO and OECD 2015), air pol-
lution caused 14,000 early deaths in Spain in 2010. The WHO further states that the impact 
of these deaths resulted in economic losses equivalent to 2.5% of GDP. The Lagares Report 
suggests a tax on non-CO2 emissions such as SO2 and NOX which is harmonized nationwide. 
Thus, we simulate a tax on NOX and SO2 applied to all sectors of the Spanish economy. Esti-
mates for the external cost of SO2 and NOX for Spain range between €5,000 up to €15,000 
per ton (Holland et al. 2005 or Markandya et al. 2010). However, the taxes on these pollutants 
introduced to date in EU countries are well below those figures ranging around €1,000 per 
ton (Labandeira and Linares 2013), which we take as the reference value for our simulation 
analysis.12 
12. Spain so far stands out for being a laggard rather than a forerunner in environmental taxation (Informe Lagares 2014 or 
Eurostat 2017). To keep with policy realism, it makes thus sense to adopt the tax rates on local air pollutants of forerunner EU 
countries as a reference value rather than setting tax rates at (much higher) external cost estimates.
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3.3 Tax on CO2 emissions in non-ETS sectors
CO2 emissions are a key driver of global warming. To date, the EU controls CO2 emissions 
within the European Union Emissions Trading System (ETS) which covers only installations 
in energy-intensive sectors. For the remaining CO2 emissions in non-ETS sectors, the EU 
Member States have committed themselves to achieve a 10% reduction on average by 2020 as 
compared to 2005 emission levels. Spain’s individual commitment is actually at the EU average 
of 10%. For our simulation analysis, we depict a CO2 tax on non-ETS sectors of €40 per ton. 
This tax is in line with recent IPCC13 recommendations for a global CO2 price of $44 per ton 
in 2020 (as part of a dynamic price path to meet the 2°C temperature target envisaged by the 
world community in the Paris Agreement). 
3.4 Rebates on revenues
The extensive literature on double dividends from green tax reforms has examined various 
ways of returning revenues from environmental taxes to the economic system, such as reve-
nue-neutral reductions in income taxes, social security contributions or VAT taxes (for Spain 
see previous revenue-recycling options suggested by Labandeira et al. 2004, Manresa 2005, or 
Markandya et al. 2013). While all of these recycling options may stimulate positive economic 
effects, they are less visible to the individual households as compared to direct tax rebates by 
which all citizens regardless of their status receive an explicit monetary transfer. Such lump-
sum refunding of green tax revenues, which is sometimes referred to as ‘eco-bonus’, has been 
discussed by the Green Party in Germany and was, for example, introduced in Switzerland 
in 2008. The political economy argument in favor of direct tax rebates is its higher visibility, 
perceived equity and social acceptability (EEA 2011). In this vein, we simulate a lump-sum 
rebate for each household. Alternatively, we investigate the effects of a proportional reduction 
in social security contributions as an indirect recycling option.
Table 1 summarizes the set of six tax policy scenarios covered by our simulation analysis. 
On the left-hand side, we consider the imposition of environmental taxes without revenue 
recycling—in this case, additional revenues remain in the public budget and lead to increased 
public spending. On the right-hand side, we consider revenue-neutral tax reforms where ad-
ditional tax revenues are either rebated lump-sum or used for reductions in social security 
contributions. 
f 4. SIMULATION RESULTS g
We discuss the simulation results for the six aforementioned scenarios in three sections: 1) 
environmental and macroeconomic impacts; 2) incidence on household groups; and 3) social 
welfare effects. If not stated differently, results are reported as percentage changes from the 
business-as-usual (BaU) situation absent any additional policy measures.
4.1 Emission reductions and GDP impacts 
The main objective of environmental taxes is to reduce harmful emissions. Figure 1 indi-
cates that the scenarios proposed succeed in this respect as the implementation of additional 
13. See the database of the long-term scenarios reviewed in the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of Working Group III of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/AR5DB.
Greener and Fairer: A Progressive Environmental Tax Reform for Spain 149
Copyright © 2019 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
green taxes lead to substantial reductions in CO2, NOX and SO2 emissions. Not surprisingly, 
policies to combat climate change and air pollution are closely linked, as in both cases the bulk 
of emissions originate from the same source, i.e. the combustion of fossil fuels. If all the taxes 
proposed are introduced jointly (Tax_All ) CO2 emissions are cut by 10%, NOX emissions by 
13% and SO2 emissions by 20% respectively. Furthermore, we see that the environmental ef-
fectiveness of the tax reform is hardly affected by our revenue recycling options. Direct rebates 
via transfers to households and indirect refunds via reductions in social contributions lead to 
almost identical decreases in emissions.
Figure 2 shows the change in GDP and the unemployment rate.14 Additional environ-
mental taxes adversely affect economic productivity by limiting the use of fuels in production 
and consumption. The joint application of all the taxes (Tax_All ) has a maximum impact on 
GDP of less than 0.6% with CO2 applied to a relatively large base being the largest single 
contributor. 
Revenue recycling (compared to the default of higher public spending) alleviate the ad-
verse GDP impacts to different degrees. As expected the positive revenue recycling effect is 
less pronounced with lump-sum rebates to households (Reform_Households) compared to the 
reduction of other pre-existing tax distortions. We see that GDP only decreases by 0.12% 
with reductions in distortionary social contributions (Reform_LAB) indicating a weak double 
dividend.15
Clearly, the GDP accounting does not value the positive environmental effects from emis-
sion reductions, which are at the origin of green tax reforms. For example, the World Health 
Organisation (WHO and OECD 2015) postulates that air pollution in Spain in the year 2010 
caused 14,000 early deaths with resulting economic losses being equivalent to 2.5% of GDP. 
4.2 Distributional effects on household groups
In the discussion of welfare impacts below it should be kept in mind that the four tax 
scenarios stand-alone (Tax_CO2, Tax_NOX,SO2, Tax_Fuel and Tax_All ) focus on the incidence 
of public revenue raising whereas the comprehensive tax reforms Reform_Households and Re-
form_LAB refer to revenue-neutral policy reforms. In the former case, the level of public good 
provision will increase with higher public revenues and we do not include potential benefits at 
14. In the base-year 2014, the unemployment rate in Spain amounted to 24%. 
15. According to Goulder (1995) “a weak double dividend claim is that returning tax revenues through cuts in distortionary 
taxes leads to cost savings relative to the case where revenues are returned lump sum. The stronger versions contend that reve-
nue-neutral swaps of environmental taxes for ordinary distortionary taxes involve zero or negative gross costs.”
TABLE 1
Summary of tax policy scenarios (acronym for each scenario in bold).
Tax policies without revenue recycling
Tax_CO2 €40/ton of CO2 in non-ETS sectors
Tax_NOX,SO2 Tax on local pollutants (NOX and SO2) equivalent to €1,000/ton
Tax_Fuel Increase of vehicle fuel up to the EU average of 1.5% revenues in GDP
Tax_All All the above taxes
Revenue-neutral tax reforms
Reform_Households All the above taxes + direct rebates from revenues to households via lump-sum transfers 
Reform_LAB All the above taxes + indirect refunding of revenues via a proportional reduction in social 
security contributions
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the individual household level from this.16 In the latter case, the provision of public goods re-
mains at the BaU level and—with the usual assumption on separability of welfare from public 
goods and private goods consumption—we can perform coherent welfare analysis across these 
tax reform packages.
16. Otherwise, there would be the need to have exact information for individual households on their specific valuation of 
changes in aggregate public good provision. 
FIGURE 1 
Emission impacts (% from BaU).
FIGURE 2
GDP impacts (% from BaU) and unemployment.
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Figure 3 shows the impact on welfare (measured in terms of Hicksian equivalent varia-
tion) for different income groups (deciles)—group 1 contains the households with the lowest 
incomes and group 10 those with the highest. 
The stand-alone taxes induce adjustment cost proportional to income so the tax incidence 
in relative terms is similar across income groups. When all the environmental taxes are levied 
without any rebate (Tax_All ) the welfare cost amounts roughly to 1.5% across all income 
groups. Thus, we do not see a regressive impact. The reasoning behind can be traced back to 
the expenditure patterns of Spanish households as shown in Figure 4. 
The taxes introduced affect energy-related goods such as heating, electricity, fuel and trans-
port. When all the taxes are applied together (Tax_All ), the price of heating increases by 12%, 
that of fuel by 10%, that of electricity by 1% and that of transport by 0.5%. Low-income 
households spend a larger proportion of their income on heating and electricity (around 4% 
of their total spending), but the regressive effect of these taxes is offset by the much higher 
proportion of spending on fuel and transport by higher-income households (around 9%).
We furthermore see from Figure 3 that the green tax reform becomes progressive when 
additional revenues are rebated directly to households. Note that while the rebate (roughly 
400€) is identical per household, its welfare impact across household types is quite different. 
For the poorest households (1st decile), a pay-check of €400 constitutes a marked increase 
in disposable income, given that in the 1st decile average annual income is €16,000. For the 
wealthiest households (10th decile) the transfer is rather negligible, given that their average 
annual income is € 75,000. In the Reform_Households scenario, most low-income households 
are in fact better off as compared to the BaU. Reductions in social contributions—although 
preferable to direct rebates in terms of GDP performances—tend to be slightly regressive and 
thus might be discarded on equity grounds. 
The CGE-MS linkage permits to decompose welfare effects by household group into 
the expenditure and income channels. Figure 5 illustrates this decomposition for five income 
FIGURE 3
Welfare impacts per income group (% of Hicksian equivalent variation (HEV) in income).
152 Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy
Copyright © 2019 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
groups (income quintiles). The welfare effect of the environmental taxes channeled through 
expenditures tends to be proportional. Likewise, the welfare effect of the taxes channeled 
through income is rather proportional. With direct rebates in Reform_Households income-re-
lated welfare impacts get positive and progressive. With reductions in social contributions 
(Reform_LAB), the positive income impacts are stronger for the high-income group than for 
low-income groups yielding a regressive effect. Table 2 provides further insights into the differ-
ential impacts on income sources. Tax_All involves negative income effects across all sources, 
especially on capital and transfers. The poorest households have net benefits from transfers 
whereas the middle and upper classes are net transfer donors. Thus, a decrease in transfers en-
FIGURE 4
Shares of energy consumptions by income group (% of total consumption).
FIGURE 5
Welfare decompositon by expenditure and income (% of Hicksian equivalent variation (HEV)  
in income).
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tails losses for the poorest households and welfare gains for the richest. Labor income is more 
important for low- and middle-income groups, whereas capital income is more important for 
high-income groups. Hence, the capital losses compensate the possible regressive effects when 
all the taxes are introduced (Tax_All ). Under Reform_Households the tax rebates to households 
make the green tax reform progressive. 
The progressiveness of direct rebates is also evident from Figure 6, which shows the impact 
of the reform before (Tax_All—cost in blue bars) and after-tax revenues are rebated to house-
holds (Reform_Households—net incidence after transfers in orange bars). In the first five deciles 
the money transfers offset the cost of the environmental tax reform, with the benefits being 
largest for the poorest households that receive an average net benefit of €203 (note the richest 
ones face a net cost of €599). 
Figure 7 reports the cost of additional green taxes and the net benefit after rebating for 
households below the poverty line as compared to households that are not at risk of poverty.17 
We see that environmental taxes cum direct rebates make vulnerable households better off and 
thereby can help to mitigate poverty in Spain. 
As can be seen from Figure 8, the welfare cost of taxation is larger than 1% (Tax_All ) for 
most households in the middle- and high-income groups. Direct tax rebates (Reform_House-
17. The poverty line is defined as 60% of the median household income. Households below that line can be considered as 
being at risk of poverty. Here, we place the line at €16000 per annum per household. 
TABLE 2
Income sources impacts (%) from BaU.
Tax_All Reform_Households Reform_LAB
Capital –2.10 –2.08 –0.72
Labour –0.13 –0.14  0.12
Transfer –0.78 –0.78 –0.83
FIGURE 6
Cost and benefits per household (in Euros).
154 Economics of Energy & Environmental Policy
Copyright © 2019 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
holds) considerably reduce the cost borne by households and increases the progressiveness of 
the environmental tax reform. 
Figure 9 provides further information on the incidence of environmental tax reforms for 
seven household types: childless couples, couples with one child, couples with more than one 
child, single-parent households, childless single persons, retired couples and retirees living 
alone.
The impacts of green tax reforms differ widely across these household types. Couples with 
and without children are most negatively affected, while those who benefit the most from the 
FIGURE 7
Cost and net benefits for households below and above the poverty threshold (in Euros).
FIGURE 8
Percentage of households with loss larger than 1%, by income deciles.
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reform are households made up of retirees. There is a close correlation between the impacts per 
household type and household income. This explains why couples with and without children 
are least favored by the tax reform package: they tend to belong to the higher income brack-
ets. Households made up of retirees tend to belong to lower income brackets, so the rebates 
increase their welfare. Single-parent and childless single-person households deserve a separate 
mention. The former tends to belong to relatively low-income brackets, but the impact of the 
rebate is not so positive for them due to their large expenditures for energy-/emission intensive 
goods whose prices go up most, i.e. heating, electricity and transport. Single-person house-
holds tend to belong to medium-to-high income brackets, but their expenditures for energy/
emission-intensive goods is relatively low—the cost of taxes for them are thus rather modest 
and in total they benefit when taxes get rebated lump-sum. Households that include retirees 
make up a substantial part of the population (28 % of the total household population) and 
have great preponderance in political decision-making. If they are better off under the tax re-
form proposed, this could significantly affect its acceptability and viability. 
4.3. Social welfare analysis
In order to assess the aggregate incidence of policy reforms across households and obtain 
insights into potential equity-efficiency trade-offs, we adopt the metric of a social welfare func-













 hY  represents the real income level of household h, 
ε is the inequality-aversion coefficient and 
N denotes the population. 
FIGURE 9
Welfare impacts per household type (in % of Hicksian equivalent variation (HEV) in income).
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Following Böhringer et al. (2012), in our analysis, we present welfare changes as changes 
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Trade-offs between efficiency and equity across alternative financing scenario are sum-
marized by alternative choices of the inequality-aversion parameter ε. A zero value of ε cor-
responds to social preferences where cost distribution across households does not matter, i.e. 
a utilitarian (Benthamite—labelled “Bentham” in Figure 10 below) perspective on efficiency 
with utility changes across individual households being perfectly substitutable. On the other 
extreme, when ε takes on an infinite value, social preferences take on a Rawlsian perspective 
(labelled “Rawls” in Figure 10 below), where it is the welfare level of the poorest household 
that determines social welfare. Figure 10 depicts the social welfare impacts across scenarios. 
Entries listed in between the two extremes “Bentham” and “Rawls” refer to results based on 
intermediate values of ε ranging from zero to infinity.
When inequality aversion is low, the social welfare effects align with the ranking by GDP 
(see Figure 2). As we abstain in our welfare analysis from quantifying the money-metric utility 
from a better environment, it is the scenario Tax_All with all the new environmental taxes 
being implemented that performs the worse in welfare terms from an efficiency perspective. 
Direct rebates to households (Reform_Households) reduce efficiency cost slightly, but not as 
much as if revenues were returned by reducing other distortionary taxes, as is the case for Re-
form_LAB. In fact, the outcome of Reform_LAB provides a double dividend, given that the tax 
FIGURE 10
Atkinson Social Welfare change by financing scenario (% from BaU).
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reform not only enhances the efficiency of the tax system but also brings about improvements 
in environmental quality. As inequality aversion becomes more important, Reform_Households 
performs much better than all the other scenarios and provides gross social welfare gains. The 
other scenarios are relatively insensitive to the choice of inequality aversion, indicating that, 
even if no refund mechanism applies, environmental taxes tend to be proportional. 
f 5. CONCLUSIONS g
As many other OECD countries, Spain faces the challenge of mitigating climate change 
and protecting the local environments in a sustainable manner. To meet such challenges 
through appropriate policy regulations, the economic discipline has pushed the concept of an 
environmental tax reform over the last decades. Such tax reforms have been shown to achieve 
at least a weak double dividend, i.e. effectively reduce environmental pressures while reducing 
the overall cost of economic adjustments to stricter environmental regulations via revenue 
recycling. Prominent among proposals for revenue recycling are revenue-neutral reductions in 
those pre-existing taxes which are most distortionary thereby enhancing the efficiency of the 
tax system. However, while these proposals are attractive from an economic efficiency perspec-
tive, they might neglect important distributional consequences across heterogeneous house-
holds. More specifically, there could be trade-offs between equity and efficiency as the most 
efficient revenue-recycling option lead to a regressive outcome. Concerns on regressive impacts 
explain in part the reluctance of Spanish policy makers to go ahead with more ambitious green 
tax reforms. The obvious policy dilemma for broader social acceptability is to find a tax policy 
design which on the one hand is environmentally effective and on the other hand appeals as 
fair without inflicting (too much on) overall economic performance.
In this paper, we show that concerns on the regressivity of additional environmental taxes 
in Spain can be muted through lump-sum transfers of green tax revenues. More specifically, 
we suggest a green tax reform where revenues from environmental taxes on vehicle fuels, air 
pollutants and CO2 emissions in non-ETS sectors are rebated to households on an equal-per-
capita basis. Such a tax reform would have a progressive impact while leading to substantial 
reductions in emissions of CO2, NOX, and SO2. Moreover—provided that societal preferences 
in Spain are rather egalitarian—the reform would improve on gross social welfare without 
an equity-efficiency trade-off to the current situation. In terms of practical policy appeal, the 
reform stands out for a simple design with only few additional environmental taxes and a clear-
cut uniform rebate mechanism. The latter could be refined towards differentiated rebates for 
more specific protection of vulnerable socio-economic groups.
The quantitative impact assessment builds on an integrated framework combining a 
multi-sector computable general equilibrium model of the Spanish economy with a micro-
simulation model of Spanish households. Our approach stands out for its comprehensive and 
consistent coverage of important economic drivers for the incidence appraisal of policy in-
terventions. Nonetheless, there are various avenues for extensions to foster and deepen poli-
cy-relevant insights. A more detailed representation of the pre-existing Spanish tax and transfer 
system for various household groups can contribute to the robustness of the simulation results; 
likewise, the explicit representation of initial regulatory “green” measures such as energy ef-
ficiency standards or quotas for renewable energy would be desirable to the extent that they 
strongly overlap and interact with environmental taxes. Our current model system is static—to 
track economic adjustment along the transition path as well as long-run effects on savings 
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and investment would call for an explicit dynamic (intertemporal) time treatment. Likewise, 
the incorporation of (endogenous) technological change induced by environmental taxation 
and alternative revenue recycling options can have non-negligible impacts on the incidence of 
green tax reforms. We plan to address such issues in future research.
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ANNEX A:  
ALMOST IDEAL DEMAND SYSTEM, ESTIMATED AS A SEEMINGLY  
UNRELATED REGRESSION
TABLE A1
Almost Ideal Demand System, estimated as a seemingly unrelated regression, estimates rounded to  
3 digits.
Food Housing Fuel Electricity Heat Transport
Education and 
Leisure Durables
ln (p_food) 0.030** –0.007 –0.018* –0.001 0.001* 0.014 –0.057* –0.011
ln(p_housing) –0.007 0.176* –0.012* 0.011* 0.001 –0.003 –0.052*  –0.110*
ln(p_fuel) –0.018* –0.012* 0.029* –0.001* –0.001* –0.014* –0.017*  0.037*
ln(p_electricity) –0.001 0.011* –0.001* 0.015* –0.001* –0.004* –0.008* –0.007*
ln(p_heat) 0.001*  0.001 –0.001* –0.001* 0.006* –0.001* –0.003* –0.002*
ln(p_transport) 0.014 –0.004 –0.014* –0.003* –0.001*  0.042* 0.013 –0.017
ln(p_leisure & 
education)
–0.057*  –0.052* –0.017* –0.008* –0.002* 0.013 0.131* –0.014
ln(p_durables) –0.011  –0.110*  0.037* –0.007* –0.002* –0.017 –0.015  0.097*
ln(p_other goods) 0.048* –0.001 –0.003 –0.006* –0.001* –0.029* 0.008  0.028**
* Statistically significant at the 5 % level.
** Statistically significant at the 10 % level
